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This Research Note presents a method to assess the quality of local governance 
practices. The multicriteria decision analysis modelling approach is illustrated 
through a real application (Portuguese municipalities). To define the criteria, 
performance descriptors, and reference levels in each dimension of local governance, 
and to account for the differences in preference of scoring in each criterion, the 
judgements of legitimate stakeholders were considered through decision 
conferencing. The constructed ‘Municipal Governance Indicator’ is calculated for the 
case of Lisbon to show the outputs of the model and its potential usefulness. 
Keywords: good governance; indicators; multicriteria decision analysis. 
 
Measuring the Quality of Local Governance 
The purpose of this Research Note is to show how the problem of measurement was 
addressed to develop a municipal governance indicator (MGI) in Portugal rather than to 
advance the on-going discussions on ‘what is governance’. Despite the lack of agreement on 
a single definition, governance refers to steering mechanisms in a certain political arena, 
emphasizing the interactions between the state – at any or all levels of governance – and 
society – including citizens and their associations, business, and the third sector (Pierre 
2014). In brief, governance relates to the way public policy decisions are made and 
implemented. With regards to its ‘quality’, ‘bad governance’ is considered to be hand in hand 
with practices such as lack of transparency and nepotism and at the root of ineffective service 
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delivery and poor social and economic outcomes (Bovaird and Löffler 2003). Conversely, 
practices such as public accountability, respect for the rule of law and public participation in 
policy-making are often regarded as ‘good governance’ traits (Hendriks 2014).  
 
Although attempting to assess these complex issues represents quite a challenging task, 
efforts towards developing useful assessment models are certainly laudable (Williams and 
Siddique 2008). This Research Note argues that Multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) 
provides a suitable framework to structure a model capable of taking into account the many 
aspects of governance and, more importantly, the opinions of specialists, practitioners and 
other legitimate decision-makers (Munda 2004). Despite this predisposition, none of the 
existing governance assessment frameworks uses MCDA modelling. 
 
Due to space constraints, this Research Note does not provide a thorough review of the state-
of-the-art of governance measurement (for a detailed review of current approaches, see e.g. 
da Cruz and Marques, 2017). It is, however, worth mentioning one of the most influential 
approaches. Developed by the World Bank in the mid-1990s, the World Wide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) are the most internationally well-known governance measures. The method 
developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) consists of the aggregation of several perception-based 
data sources (compiled by international NGOs) into six dimensions of governance, for each 
country, using an unobserved components model. The source indicators are rescaled to run 
from 0.0 to 1.0 and the six WGI vary approximately from -2.5 to 2.5 where higher values 
should represent better governance.  
 
Governance assessments are only truly useful if the results inform the users (which, 
depending on the aim, can be the subjects under evaluation, donors, citizens or other 
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stakeholders) and point out to what could or should be done to improve outcomes (Wilson et 
al. 2011). This often requires a participatory modelling process so that the users’ needs are 
taken into account (Stewart 2006). In addition, to develop sound governance indicators, some 
basic theoretical principles of Measurement Theory must be respected. For instance, most 
composite indicators that arguably measure governance-related aspects, including the WGI,  
suffer from what Keeney (1992) calls ‘the most common critical mistake’, that is, using 
arbitrary weights to generate an ‘overall score’ (da Cruz et al. 2016). Finally, perception-
based data may not be suitable to construct governance indicators since, for example, it is 
problematic to link citizen trust and/or satisfaction with good governance (see Bouckaert and 
Walle 2003). 
 
Most governance measurements efforts have been carried out at the national level (to 
determine the ‘governance level’ of each country). Nevertheless, the global urbanisation 
trend, the move towards localism and the decentralised provision of essential public services 
in many jurisdictions (Wilson et al. 2011), and the fact that “the quality of governance varies 
enormously within countries” (Fukuyama 2013, 366), increasingly puts the focus at the local 
level. Still, there are much fewer examples of local governance assessments. 
 
One notable exception is the Urban Governance Index (UGI) developed by UN-Habitat. On 
the strengths of this approach, it should be highlighted that the UGI was constructed with a 
bottom-up approach, where the several underlying indicators were selected with the 
participation of representatives of 24 cities from 14 countries (UN-Habitat 2005). Moreover, 
the underlying indicators relied on hard data, although several of these indicators were binary 
scores (from yes/no queries). Regarding the UGI’s weaknesses, the procedure adopted to 
determine the weights of the indicators to calculate the four ‘sub-indexes’ (‘Effectiveness’, 
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‘Equity’, ‘Participation’ and ‘Accountability’) was based on an intuitive notion of 
‘importance’ (without any reference to impact scales/ranges) and the overall score was then 
computed as the simple average of these ‘sub-indexes’. As argued by Keeney (1992), both 
processes are theoretically incorrect.  
 
Measuring the quality of local governance has two main drivers. First, with such an 
assessment citizens may gain access to better information (empowering them to enforce 
accountability mechanisms) and incentives to improve processes/outcomes can be provided 
to the governance structures (Heinrich et al. 2010). Second, the operationalization of the 
quality of local governance enables the investigation of its links to economic performance 
and other social indicators. Along with the empirical work on the socio-economic effects of 
good/poor governance practices and outcomes, it would also be valuable to investigate the 
influence of certain constraints or externalities on governance scores. In theory, unravelling 
the determinants of good local governance could contribute to devising better institutional 
environments. MCDA modelling can represent a major contribution to this research agenda. 
However, urbanists, political scientists and public administration scholars have seldom 
engaged with these methods and there is also a general absence of discussion around 
governance indicators in the Decision Analysis or the broader Operations Research literature. 
 
The remainder of this Research Note is organised as follows: the following section briefly 
outlines the context of the case-study, the methodological approach and the initial steps taken 
to structure the model. The third section describes the decision conferencing process, 
including how the criteria and descriptors were fine-tuned and the weighting coefficients 
were calculated in a participatory manner. The fourth section provides an empirical 
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illustration of the outputs of the MCDA model (for the case of Lisbon) and the fifth section 
concludes the paper. 
 
Case-study, Methods and Model Structuring 
Local governance in Portugal 
Local government is democratic in Portugal since 1974 (first elections in 1976). From then 
on, municipalities became the major players in the country’s territorial development and one 
of the most important pressure groups in Portuguese politics (Tavares and Camões 2010). 
Currently, there are 308 municipalities responsible for delivering essential infrastructure 
services (mainly, water, wastewater, urban transport and waste services). Local governments 
also play an important role in other areas such as culture, tourism and, increasingly, social 
welfare and basic education. Portugal is a suitable context for testing the development of a 
MGI through MCDA modelling because all local governments operate under the same rules 
and have a similar institutional architecture (some features vary as a function of population 
size but the powers and institutions remain the same across the country). 
 
Despite its contributions to social cohesion and proximity, the recent history of local 
government in Portugal has also been bounded by institutional failure and wrongful 
governance practices. The great authority and discretion given to mayors and the fact that 
local governments are major employers, regulators, and service providers in many 
municipalities has often led to corruption and clientelism (De Sousa 2008). Furthermore, new 
modes of delivery of urban services and/or infrastructures (e.g. the creation of municipal 
companies) and new types of interaction with the private sector (e.g. the development of local 
public-private partnership–PPP–arrangements) raised important governance issues. In the 
current context there are little incentives for achieving good municipal governance (De Sousa 
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et al. 2015). Local governments have been known to deal with these issues and with reporting 
and accountability procedures quite differently from one municipality to another (da Cruz et 
al. 2016).  
 
Methodology and Ownership of the Problem 
MCDA literature and scholarship studies theoretically-sound and meaningful ways of 
transforming ‘impacts’ into ‘scores’ (i.e. associate a number in a scale to a real-world 
performance) and transforming ‘partial’ scores (i.e. scores in a particular criterion) into 
‘overall’ scores (i.e. aggregating the scores of the various criteria to come about with a single 
overall score). Using an additive model (sum of weighted scores) to aggregate the scores of 
each criterion and calculate the overall governance level has several advantages (Mateus et al. 
2008). More than just being able to rank municipalities – for example, according to their 
overall score – MCDA modelling allows for evaluating outcomes against each criterion 
individually (according to their partial scores) or for each dimension of governance (sum of 
weighted scores of the criteria contained in each particular dimension of governance) (da 
Cruz and Marques 2013). Nevertheless, “in a multi-criteria framework, what really matters is 
the process since the problem structuring will determine the result” (Munda 2004, 673). This 
is why it is essential to design a participatory process to structure the model and take into 
account the values and opinions of the problem owner or legitimate decision-maker(s). 
Contrary to most multiple criteria problems, the purpose or process of assessing the quality of 
local governance does not have a single, easily identifiable, and legitimate decision-maker. 
The MGI for Portugal was modelled with the input of practitioners and stakeholders with 
responsibilities over (or affected by) local governance. 
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After resolving the decision-maker issue it is necessary to collect his/her/their input to (in 
brief): 1) validate the assessment framework and the criteria of (good) local governance, 2) 
select suitable quantitative or qualitative descriptors to measure performance in each 
criterions, and 3) define the reference levels of the criteria so that the weighting coefficients 
may be obtained (Bana e Costa et al. 2012). Since ‘the process’ is the main concern, each 
MCDA model is tailored to fit a particular problem. And although the structuring process 
might be troublesome, the additive hierarchical model that aggregates the scores of the 
various criteria is quite simple. A hierarchical model is a composition of simple additive 
models, adapted to a hierarchical criteria structure (Mateus et al. 2008) – for example, ‘good 
governance’ at the top of the hierarchy, followed by several ‘dimensions of governance’, 
followed by individual underlying criteria. An additive model can be represented through 
expression (1): 
 





















where G(mi) is the overall governance level of municipality mi, Gj(mi) is the score of the 
municipality in the criterion j; goodj and neutralj are the reference levels of performance on 







1  and 0jc . 
 
As can be seen in Equation (1), the scores of 0 and 100 were arbitrarily assigned to the 
‘Neutral’ and the ‘Good’ reference levels in each criterion. Whereas establishing these 
anchors is not a requirement (e.g. the minimum and maximum values could have been 
selected to construct the interval scale), experience shows that selecting the ‘Neutral’ (below 
which performance would be considered to be negative – governance worst practices) and the 
‘Good’ (above which performance would be considered to be extremely positive – 
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governance best practices) performance levels has some cognitive advantages (Bana e Costa 
and Oliveira 2012). Structured in this manner, the scores will have intrinsic meaning to the 
user (and also to the decision-maker while eliciting qualitative judgments to compute the 
weights in the decision conferences – see the ‘Decision Conferencing’ section). 
 
Consultation with Key Stakeholders 
In the scoping phase of this study, virtually all the major entities whose missions concerned 
(even if only marginally) local governance in Portugal were contacted. The purpose was to 
present the objectives of the MGI, gather feedback on what should be measured and why, and 
learn what data they possess (to feed the MCDA model). The name and scope of these 
entities are the following: 
 
 Agency for Administrative Modernisation (AMA). This agency endeavours to 
modernize and simplify public services and administrations (e.g. through e-government 
initiatives). 
 Central Department for Investigation and Penal Action (DCIAP) of the Prosecutor 
General’s Office. It investigates crimes of corruption or fraud in obtaining and diverting 
subsidies, subventions or credit, and economic/financial infringements. 
 Court of Auditors (TC). This supreme audit institution examines the legality of public 
expenditure and accounting. 
 Directorate-General for Justice Policy (DGPJ). Responsible for the statistical data in the 
Ministry of Justice. 
 Directorate-General for Local Administration (DGAL). Responsible for the design and 
implementation of measures to support local government (e.g. regarding financial 
management) and for the cooperation between central and local administrations. 
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 General Inspector of Finance (IGF). Controls the legality and audits the financial 
management and the performance of public sector entities (including local 
governments). 
 Institute of Construction and Real Estate (InCI). Sector-specific regulator of 
construction activities and real estate; among other competences, InCI has to produce 
statistical information regarding public works (procurement procedures, etc.). 
 National Agency for Public Procurement (ANCP). It manages the national system for 
public procurement. 
 National Association of Portuguese Municipalities (ANMP). ANMP represents the 
municipalities in order to promote and defend their interests. 
 Ombudsman. It represents the interests of the public by investigating and addressing 
complaints of maladministration or disregard for the rule of law by governmental 
institutions. 
 Transparência e Integridade, Associação Cívica (TIAC). It is the official national 
contact of Transparency International. This civic association works to fight corruption 
in Portugal, raise public awareness regarding this issue, and monitor progress in this 
area. 
 
From this list, six entities immediately showed interest in the research and scheduled 
meetings with the authors (AMA, IGF, InCI, DGPJ, DCIAP and TIAC). In these meetings, 
the MGI framework (definition of governance and the several dimensions), the possible 
criteria and the data available were the main topics discussed. 
 
Populating the Value Tree 
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To operationalize the concept of municipal governance, an adaptation of the definition 
proposed in the WGI project was assumed (Kaufmann et al. 2010). Governance was defined 
as the ‘traditions and institutions by which authority in a country, region or municipality is 
exercised’. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced (‘Voice and accountability’ and ‘Political stability’); (b) the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies (‘Government 
effectiveness’ and ‘Regulatory quality’); (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (‘Rule of law’ and 
‘Control of corruption’).  
 
Although Kaufmann et al. defined six dimensions of governance, considering the Portuguese 
local administration, the ‘Rule of law’ and the ‘Control of corruption’ can be treated as one 
dimension (municipalities abide by the same rules and the judicial system operates at the 
national level). Thus, the assessment framework was structured as follows: 
 
A. Voice and accountability – criteria capturing the extent to which citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their local government and have access to important information 
for monitoring performance. 
B. Political stability – criteria capturing the political strength of local governments and the 
steadiness of the policies. 
C. Government effectiveness – criteria capturing the quality of public services, the 
absence of political patronage, the quality and credibility of the policies formulated and 
implemented. 
D. Market access and regulation (changed from ‘Regulatory quality’ during the decision 
conferences) – criteria capturing the capacity of the local government to formulate and 
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implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
E. Rule of law & prevention (instead of ‘control’) of corruption – criteria capturing the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement and with the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain. 
 
Note that any other conceptual framework could have been implemented. These definitions 
and dimensions of governance were adopted because they are widely recognized and used by 
practitioners and scholars. In any case, the purpose was simply to provide a starting point for 
the discussions carried out with the decision-making group (DMG, see the ‘Decision 
Conferencing’ section). After the consultation phase with key stakeholders, the research team 
was able to suggest the value tree represented in Figure 1 (to be completely accurate, the 
criteria A3 and B3 were added during the decision conferences). Still, it is fair to wonder 
whether the value tree would be very different if the WGI framework was not suggested to 
expedite the process and it was left open for the stakeholders to complete (e.g. through an 
additional decision conference just to conceptualise the problem). This may be a limitation. 
However, the extra time commitment could also have jeopardised the feasibility of the 
modelling process. 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
To transform the many aspects of the problem into evaluation criteria, all the aspects 
considered to be relevant (by the decision-maker) should be considered. Nevertheless, some 
constraints have to be respected, for instance: criteria must be non-redundant and 
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preferentially independent (Siskos et al. 2014) and the data should be up-to-date and 
retrievable for all municipalities (da Cruz and Marques 2013). Criteria must also have 
theoretical grounding (Andrews et al. 2010). If good municipal governance is interpreted as 
the way the local government-general society interactions should occur, then governance 
assessments rely on a set of criteria that are unavoidably normative (Bouckaert and Van de 
Walle 2003). Table 1 presents the normative principles behind the MGI’s criteria. 
 




The validation and fine-tuning of the set of criteria and respective descriptors as well as the 
determination of weights of the additive model was carried out in two decision conferences 
(Phillips 2007). Several entities were consulted and invited to establish a wide-ranging group 
of decision-makers (the DMG), representing the citizens, the local administration, the central 
government and the audit/monitoring institutions. All entities representing the local 
administration refused to participate (namely, the ANMP, the National Association of Civil 
Parishes, and the National Association of Local Civil Servants).  
 
In the end, the DMG was composed of the Director-General of the TC and Secretary-General 
of the Council for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC), the President of TIAC, a 
representative from the Department of Innovation and Knowledge Management of AMA, and 
the Inspector of Finance (Director) from IGF responsible for local administration issues. The 
decision conferences took place in Lisbon on 1 and 12 March 2013, and the two authors of 
this paper acted as facilitators. The MGI is a model of good local governance which is 
13 
aligned with the values of the participants in the decision conferences who fine-tuned and 
validated the criteria set. A different DMG would likely render a different MGI (i.e. the 
values and/or priorities of the participants could be different and that would reflect on the 
criteria, descriptors and relative weighting coefficients of the model). 
 
Fine-Tuning the Criteria and Performance Descriptors 
During the decision conferences, several adjustments were made to the MGI (the DMG was 
allowed to change everything about the model). Some of the modifications were conceptual. 
For instance, to be more in line with the Portuguese local administration reality, the DMG 
decided to change the name of dimension ‘D’ to ‘Market access and regulation’ and of 
dimension ‘E’ to ‘Rule of law and prevention of corruption’. The criteria ‘A3 – Political 
accountability’ and ‘B3 – Pluralism in decision-making’ and respective descriptors (see the 
Appendix) were added during the first decision conference. The extensive expertise of the 
elements of the DMG on local administration matters was crucial in this process. 
 
The criteria are operationalized by quantitative or qualitative descriptors (ordered sets of 
plausible impact levels). The natural, proxy or constructed descriptors must preserve the 
independence in terms of preference of the criteria (Mateus et al. 2008). The final 
performance descriptors adopted for the Portuguese MGI during the decision conferences are 
presented in the Appendix. By operationalizing broad and complex concepts, these 
innovative descriptors may be a helpful resource for local governance assessment 
frameworks in other international jurisdictions. 
 
Data availability (up-to-date and systematically obtainable for all Portuguese municipalities) 
was a major constraint to the selection of performance descriptors. For instance, as pointed 
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out by the DMG, for criterion D1 ‘Market access’ the average number of bidders in public 
tenders could be a preferable performance descriptor (a higher number would indicate lower 
levels of favouritism and collusion) but this information is not available for all municipalities. 
Instead, we had to consider the average number of contracts obtained by each supplier for 
contracts over 150.000€ (threshold above which a public tender is mandatory by law) in the 
last four years (local governments have a four-year term) as a proxy descriptor. Several data 
sources feed the performance descriptors presented in the Appendix, for example:  the 
National Elections Commission the TC, the Ombudsman, DGAL, local governments’ 
websites, InCI’s public procurement online database, minutes of the meetings of municipal 
parliaments and local executives, annual reports of local governments and municipal 
companies (including financial statements), the National Statistics Institute, the annual 
reports of the Water and Waste Services Regulation Authority, and the Portuguese 
Environmental Agency. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the criteria and descriptors underlying this model to 
measure the quality of local governance include both institutional aspects (e.g. the use of 
participatory budgeting) and output/outcome aspects (e.g. the quality of services). 
Methodologically, this does not represent a problem; the only rules the criteria/descriptors 
need to follow concern their comprehensiveness, non-redundancy and preferential 
independence (Keeney 1992). Conceptually, however, this could be problematic if one sees 
(the quality of) governance strictly as a product of institutional features and processes. This is 
obviously not the case of the model presented in this Research Note (see the definition in 
section ‘Populating the Value Tree’). 
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Including the dimension ‘Government effectiveness’ can be subject to criticism. Still, the key 
tenet of the approach proposed here is that the resulting model should ultimately measure 
what the DMG wants it to measure. Therefore, if this group decides to look at the institutional 
features and outcomes of governance (and has recognised legitimacy to do so) then the 
developed MGI model should comply with this conceptual preference, taking into account 
the local context. Obviously, any individual that is not a member of this DMG can disagree 
with the definitions, contents and preferences embedded in this model. 
 
Despite the fact that all entities representing the Portuguese local administration refused to 
participate in the decision conferences – which represents a problem to this approach – the 
DMG included leading representatives from three crucial interest or stakeholder groups vis-à-
vis the quality of local governance in Portugal (independent auditing institutions, central 
government agencies, and citizens). Therefore, although it does not include the preferences of 
the entities being assessed (which is not so rare in evaluation frameworks...), the composition 
of this DMG should grant a considerable amount of legitimacy to the model developed here. 
 
Scoring Functions 
Several numerical (e.g. direct rating, of bisection method, von Winterfeldt and Edwards 
1986) and non-numerical (e.g. the Measuring Attractiveness by a Categorical Based 
Evaluation Technique – MACBETH, Bana e Costa and Oliveira 2012) methodologies have 
been used in the literature to construct scoring functions (that convert performance impacts 
into scores in an interval scale). However, given the absence of a univocal problem owner, 
the very time-consuming process of modelling non-linear scoring functions could originate 
‘decision fatigue’ among the representatives that volunteered to be part of the DMG. 
Therefore, to develop a model that is feasible and able to estimate the governance level 
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satisfactorily, linear scoring functions (or preference scales with equal distances between 
consecutive levels for qualitative descriptors) were assumed and validated by the DMG for 
all criteria. 
 
Certainly, being a simplification, using linear scoring functions has its limitations. For 
instance, regarding the criterion B2 ‘Political strength of decisions’, the scoring function 
might be a concave down increasing curve (‘too many’ seats for the winning list in a given 
municipality may even be a sign of democratic deficit); however, since in Portugal winning 
lists rarely are above the 60% share (seats are attributed using the D'Hondt method), using a 
linear relationship is not so problematic. Moreover, the DMG was aware of this and allowed 
to change it during decision conferencing (and e.g. to establish minimum and maximum 
scores, below 0.0 and above 100.0). It was concluded that in the few criteria where the non-
linearity could be more important (e.g. voter turnout), the actual performances were clustered 
in a small range between the established reference levels (in these few cases, the linearity was 
regarded as perfectly reasonable by the DMG).  
 
Computing the Weights 
After the validation of the MGI value-tree (with 23 criteria), the DMG was asked to set the 
‘Neutral’ and the ‘Good’ performance levels in each criterion (the selected levels for all 
criteria are presented in Table 2). As for modelling scoring functions, the literature provides 
many numerical techniques to compute weighting coefficients (e.g. swing weighting or the 
trade-off procedure, see Greco et al. 2010). Nevertheless, it would be counterproductive to 
ask the members of a non-technical, heterogeneous DMG to express their preference 
judgements numerically (Bana e Costa et al. 2012). We adopted the MACBETH approach to 
avoid this cognitive uneasiness (Bana e Costa and Oliveira 2012). With this technique it is 
17 
possible to determine the weights by asking the DMG to make pairwise comparisons through 
qualitative judgments of the differences in preference of certain reference profiles. 
 
The procedure to compute the MGI weights was as follows. For each dimension (with n 
criteria), the DMG was asked to consider a set of n+1 hypothetical municipalities, where n 
municipalities have a ‘Good’ performance in one criterion and a ‘Neutral’ performance in the 
remainder (each municipality has ‘Good’ performance in a different criterion) and one 
municipality is ‘Neutral’ all over (Figure 2 was shown to the DMG to explain this). 
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
The DMG was then asked to place the n municipalities in order of preference (evidently, the 
‘Neutral’ all over is the least preferred). After this assortment, the participants had to compare 
these municipalities in terms of preference by providing qualitative judgements using seven 
possible categories: ‘no’, ‘very weak’, ‘weak’, ‘moderate’, ‘strong’, ‘very strong’ or 
‘extreme’ difference. To assist us in this process, we used the M-MACBETH software which 
allows the DMG to fill in a matrix of categorical judgments on-the-spot and then derives a 
compatible scale (if the judgments are consistent). Bana e Costa et al. (2012) details the linear 
programing algorithm that determines the weights according to the qualitative judgements. 
To be able to compute all the weights in the two sessions, the DMG only had to elicit 
judgements between two consecutive reference profiles (corresponding to the first diagonal 
of the MACBETH matrix, as shown in Figure 3 for the ‘Rule of law and prevention of 
corruption’ dimension). 
 
[Insert Figure 3] 
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The steps described above had to be repeated for each of the five dimensions of the MGI (i.e. 
one matrix such as the one shown in Figure 3 for each dimension). This allowed to compute 
the (intra) weights of the criteria in each dimension of municipal governance. In order to 
obtain the overall governance score, the (inter or global) weights of the MGI also had to be 
calculated. To achieve this, the DMG compared one criterion from each dimension in a new 
matrix of judgments (see Figure 4, the criteria with higher weights in each dimension were 
arbitrarily chosen to carry out this comparison). With this final set of judgments it is possible 
to normalize all weights through linear transformations. This hierarchical approach presented 
a clear advantage: trying to compute the global weights at once (instead of one dimension at a 
time), would result in a 24x24 matrix and ordering the hypothetical municipalities (i.e. the 
reference profiles) would have been very difficult for the DMG. 
 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
The main results of the two decision conferences, i.e. the global weights of the MGI model, 
are presented in Figure 5. As can easily be seen, a swing from ‘Neutral’ to ‘Good’ (or vice-
versa) in criterion ‘C1 – Debt management’ has the greatest impact in the overall score, 
followed by the criteria measuring the quality of essential services. Since the weight of each 
dimension of municipal governance is equal to the sum of the global weights of the criteria 
contained in it, the ‘Government effectiveness’ dimension is the one with the highest weight 
(next to ‘Voice and accountability’, ‘Rule of law and prevention of corruption’, ‘Political 
stability’ and, finally, ‘Market access and regulation’). With these weighting coefficients, the 
reference values presented in Table 2, and the detailed explanation of the descriptors 
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presented in the Appendix, one can assess the quality of governance of virtually any 
Portuguese municipality (all feeding data is publicly accessible). 
 
[Insert Figure 5] 
 
Illustration: The Municipality of Lisbon 
The MGI structured through a participatory process with key stakeholders was applied to the 
municipality of Lisbon (the Portuguese capital) to illustrate the outputs of the model. Table 2 
presents the ‘Neutral’ and ‘Good’ reference levels for all criteria as well as the performances 
and scores for Lisbon. A quick reading of the scores obtained immediately shows that the 
DMG may have been overambitious in selecting the reference levels (given the current state 
of affairs regarding governance practices). Only in one criterion (‘C4 – Quality of wastewater 
services’) did the performance of this municipality surpass the ‘Good’ reference level. In 
contrast, performances were considerably below the ‘Neutral’ reference level for several 
criteria. However, this does not mean that the model was badly structured or that it is 
unbalanced. Being based on normative principles that stipulate what local governments 
should be doing to achieve municipal governance best practices, and being this the first time 
that such practices are being assessed, it should be expected that municipalities depict low 
scores (the same was observed for the measurement of local government transparency, see da 
Cruz et al. 2016). In fact, the main idea is to encourage incremental improvements, which 
would not be the case if the status quo was positively assessed. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
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Figure 6 shows the local governance profile of Lisbon. This municipality obtained an overall 
governance score of -34.24 which means that the governance practices are generally below 
the acceptable level (from the point of view of the DMG). By detailing the scores in each 
dimension, this profile also allows us to identify what are the areas that deserve special 
attention. The figures in bold next to the bars represent the intra dimension scores (i.e. the 
scores in each criterion weighted by the ‘intra’ weights), while the figures in brackets are the 
weighted scores that contribute to the overall MGI value. 
 
[Insert Figure 6] 
 
Conclusion 
The MGI developed for Portuguese municipalities with the input from key stakeholders 
enabled the operationalization the concept of governance through MCDA modelling. This 
Research Note shows how complex issues can be translated into objective descriptors and 
how the performances according to these descriptors can be aggregated in a sensible manner 
to assess the problem globally. The usefulness of the results can range from public advocacy 
efforts to purely academic explorations where the MGI may be used as a dependent variable. 
 
Cities currently compete for practical and tangible issues such as financial resources and new 
investments (Morais and Camanho 2011). Aspects such as transparency, control of corruption 
and public participation are often not a priority for local governments, although the literature 
recognizes them as being crucial for overall wellbeing (Herian et al. 2012). In theory, the 
MGI could help to (re)align the objectives of local politicians with these normative 
principles. In practice, even if the construction of rankings or ratings is deemed to be 
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counterproductive, the disclosure of results such as local governance profiles could help 
stakeholders to make sense of and use information that is otherwise dispersed or inaccessible. 
 
The additive aggregation model proposed here is ‘compensatory’, which could potentially be 
a limitation. However, the fact that poor outcomes in certain criteria might be compensated 
by excellent scores in other criteria (and vice-versa) was not considered to be problematic by 
the DMG, given the ‘Good’ and ‘Neutral’ levels established. The extra complexity of non-
compensatory modelling could have a black-box effect and discourage practical application 
and general use by the citizens. The possibility of considering maximum and minimum scores 
in each criterion was debated but disregarded for the time being (only to be revisited in pilot 
studies with more municipalities). 
 
Local governance indicators developed through the approach presented in this Research Note 
are deeply reliant on the composition of the DMG. The representativeness and legitimacy of 
the model depends on the representativeness and legitimacy of the group of people that 
jointly negotiate and express their preferences during the structuring and modelling 
processes. Rather than a weakness, this can be seen as a key advantage of MCDA modelling 
– otherwise it would be a purely technocratic (and perhaps undemocratic) exercise. 
Furthermore, since contexts and preferences change over time, this type of initiative should 
be constantly audited and revised by the relevant stakeholders allowing for incremental 
improvements in the quality of local governance and the suitability of the indicators – 
especially if the intention is to apply the model systematically (e.g. yearly). In the case of the 
MGI developed for the Portuguese context and used as an illustration in this study, the results 
should preferably be discussed with representatives from the local authorities. Depending on 
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the purpose and scope of the application, the model could then be revised to take into account 
the feedback from this key group of stakeholders (via decision conferencing, Phillips 2007). 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the MCDA framework allows for robustness and sensitivity 
analysis. For instance, it is possible to impose small variations to the weights (while still 
respecting the matrixes of judgement of the DMG) in order to observe how the overall results 
would change (e.g. the M-MACBETH software provides this feature). This can be used to 
compute ‘margins of error’ for the scores obtained for the municipalities (which many 
authors consider to be valuable, Kaufmann et al. 2010). 
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Figure 2. Example Presented to the Decision-making Group to Explain the Weighting 
Protocol (Macbeth Judgments between Reference Profiles). 
  
 
Figure 3. Matrix of Judgments for the Dimension ‘Rule of Law & Prevention of Corruption’ 








Figure 5. Weights of the MGI. 
 
 












A1 An active participation of local civic groups and individual citizens in the meetings 
of municipal parliaments makes local governments more accountable. 
A2 Allowing citizens to decide on how to allocate a significant part of the municipal 
budget (i.e. formulating and selecting local investments) is an effective way of 
giving voice to citizens’ concerns. 
A3 Citizens should be able to know the career path of the elected officials and to 
ascertain whether or not they are prone be influenced by certain lobbies or have 
motivations other than protecting the public interest at all times; the opposition 
should have the means to effectively carry out this monitoring even more closely. 
A4 Despite the strict national accounting rules for all local governments, the quality of 
this reporting differs substantially from one municipality to another (especially 
regarding off-budget spending and off balance sheet debt). 
A5 and 
A6 
High levels of transparency allow citizens to know what the processes, structures and 
products of government are; publicly disclosing some crucial items increases public 
trust and provides incentives to accountable public management. 
Political 
stability 
B1 High electoral participation is a symptom of a healthy democracy; efforts to involve 
citizens and raise awareness by local parties and/or candidates along with public 
trust on local institutions should result in higher voter turnouts. 
B2 Holding the majority of the seats is crucial for empowering local governments; 
certain local reforms might only be feasible if the winning list has political strength. 
B3 The ability to generate consensus by taking into account the views and opinions of 
others (namely the non-elected councilmen) is beneficial for society and promotes 
political stability. 
B4 The public interest should be safeguarded against political manoeuvring and a 
change in the executive should not prevent good policies from being pursued; 
continuous, credible and long-term planning effectively involving local 
stakeholders contributes to achieving this. 
Government 
effectiveness 
C1 Very high debt levels may hinder the economic sustainability of municipalities; 
effective local governments should be able to meet their responsibilities in terms of 
public service delivery without jeopardizing future borrowing capacity. 
C2 The credibility of local policies and planning is strongly associated with the 
credibility of the budget. 
C3, C4 
and C5 
The availability and quality of local infrastructure services (considered to be 
services of general economic interest) is essential for the wellbeing of citizens. 
C6 Though often financially unsustainable (non-economic services of general interest), 
social, cultural, education and recreational services are crucial to promote 
development and social cohesion. 
Market access 
and regulation 
D1 Favouritism (local governments) and/or collusion (suppliers) make prices detach 
from costs; with effective competition for the market, few suppliers should not be 
able to win several public contracts.  
D2 The use of price signals (e.g. inclining blocks or seasonal rates) and ensuring the 
financial sustainability of utility services are good regulatory practices. 
D3 Higher local taxes hinder consumption and private sector development. 
Rule of law & 
prevention of 
corruption 
E1 Suppliers and contractors often have to cope with late payments from local 
governments and some municipalities build a (bad) reputation due to the time taken 
to settle invoices. 
E2 Public procurement is a key area for risks of corruption at the local level and the 
major problems arise in direct awards. 
E3 Good public contracts (well drafted, legal) protect the public interest. 
E4 Individuals or businesses are more prone to submit a complaint to the ombudsman 
when they feel that the local government or its entities (e.g. municipal companies) 
fail to respect for the rule of law. 
 
Table 2. ‘Neutral’ and ‘Good’ Reference Levels and the Performances and Scores Attained by 
Lisbon. 
Criteria Reference levels Performances for 
Lisbon 
Scores for 
Lisbon Good Neutral 
A1 Level II Level IV Level II  100.00 
A2 5.0% 1.0% 3.5%  62.50 
A3 Level II Level III Level V -200.00 
A4 Level II Level III Level IV -100.00 
A5 Level II Level III Level IV -100.00 
A6 5.9 4.7 5.5  66.67 
B1 75% 50% 53%  12.00 
B2 75% 50% 53%  12.00 
B3 80% 60% 60%  0.00 
B4 Level II Level IV Level III  50.00 
C1 30% 60% 154% -313.33 
C2 80% 70% 64% -60.00 
C3 Level II Level IV Level V -50.00 
C4 Level II Level IV Level I  150.00 
C5 Level II Level IV Level II  100.00 
C6 89 € per capita 55 € per capita 58 € per capita  8.82 
D1 1.1 contracts/supplier 1.5 contracts/supplier 1.92 contracts/supplier -105.00 
D2 Level II Level IV Level II  100.00 
D3 164 € per capita 285 € per capita 592 € per capita -253.72 
E1 20 days 90 days 95 days -7.14 
E2 90% 66% 48% -75.00 
E3 99% 95% 99%  100.00 
E4 3.0 complaint/104 
inh. 




Table A1. MGI performance descriptors 
Criterion Descriptor 
A1 Level I.  In each of the last 5 meetings of the Municipal Parliament several citizens intervened 
on their own behalf to discuss a subject of interest to the community. One civic 
association of citizens was also represented in at least 3 of the last 5 meetings and in 
each occasion it presented an issue of general/collective interest. 
Level II.  In each of the last 5 meetings of the Municipal Parliament several citizens intervened 
on their own behalf to discuss a subject of interest to the community. 
Level III.  In at least 3 of the last 5 meetings of the Municipal Parliament several citizens 
intervened on their own behalf to discuss a subject of interest to the community. 
Level IV. In the last 5 meetings of the Municipal Parliament, only occasionally the public 
discussed a subject of interest to the community. 
Level V. In the last 5 meetings of the Municipal Parliament, there was no public participation or 
only particular interests were presented. 
A2 Amount available for the participatory budget (in % of total annual investment). 
A3 Level I.  The Municipal Parliament established a “Statement of Disclosure of Interests” system 
mandatory for all members and accessible to any citizen who requests it (without 
limitations). There is also a Conflict of Interests Statement system applicable to the 
members of the executive and legislative branches of government. The report of the 
Statute of the Right of the Opposition contains the opinions of non-elected councilmen, 
was approved in the Municipal Parliament and is available online. The detailed CVs of 
the Mayor and councilmen are available in the website of the municipalities, as well as 
their remunerations. 
Level II.  The Municipal Parliament established a “Statement of Disclosure of Interests” system 
mandatory for all members and accessible to any citizen who requests it (without 
limitations). The report of the Statute of the Right of the Opposition contains the 
opinions of non-elected councilmen, was discussed in the Municipal Parliament and is 
available online. The detailed CVs of the Mayor and councilmen are available in the 
website of the municipalities. 
Level III.  The Municipal Parliament established a “Statement of Disclosure of Interests” system 
mandatory for all members and it may be available to the citizens upon request (subject 
to approval). The report of the Statute of the Right of the Opposition was discussed in 
the Municipal Parliament and is available online. The detailed CVs of the Mayor and 
councilmen are available in the website of the municipalities. 
Level IV. The detailed CVs of the Mayor and councilmen are available in the website of the 
municipalities. 
Level V. None of the above levels is fully respected. 
A4 Level I.  The last annual financial statement includes full and detailed information on revenues, 
expenditures and financial assets and liabilities. This statement consolidates all the 
participations of the municipality (corporate and non-corporate). Any contingent 
liabilities for guarantees or warranties with local PPPs are fully disclosed. The 
revenues and expenditures of utilities are allocated to each type of service and reflect 
the costs of the social choices. 
Level II.  The last annual financial statement includes full and detailed information on revenues, 
expenditures and financial assets and liabilities. This statement consolidates all the 
capital participations of the municipality (public and mixed entities). Any contingent 
liabilities for guarantees or warranties with local PPPs are fully disclosed. The 
revenues and expenditures of utilities are allocated to each type of service. 
Level III.  The last annual financial statement includes full and detailed information on revenues, 
expenditures and financial assets and liabilities. This statement consolidates the 
majority of the capital participations of the municipality (public and mixed entities). 
The revenues and expenditures of utilities are allocated to each type of service. 
Level IV. The last annual financial statement includes full and detailed information on revenues, 
expenditures and financial assets and liabilities. All public and mixed municipal 
companies present their own detailed financial reports. 
Level V. None of the above levels is fully respected. 
A5 Level I.  All items in Table A2 are available online. 
Level II.  All the items of “predictive information” and “financial information” are available as 
well as 6 items of the “additional information” (including “Procurement” and 
“Transfers and subsidies”). 
Level III.  All the items of “predictive information” and “financial information” are available. 
The items “Procurement” and “Transfers and subsidies” are also available (“additional 
information”). 
Level IV. All the items of “predictive information” and “financial information” are available. 







v 1  
Note: the items are presented in Table A3 (N=18); vi =-5 if item i is unavailable; vi=5 if the item 
or topic is linked in the main page or if the item appears in a web search with its terms; vi=10 if 
the item or topic is linked in the main page and if the item appears in a web search with its terms. 
B1 Voter turnout in the last election (%). 
B2 Seats obtained in the last election (%). 
B3 Approval of predictive and financial accountability documents (% councilmen votes). 
B4 Level I.  The local government follows a long-term strategic plan (at least for the next 10 years). 
This plan was drafted involving a vast array of stakeholders, including the local 
community, and is continuously discussed/revised with the opposition 
parties/councilmen. Partial goals or intermediate targets are frequently assessed by the 
Municipal Parliament. Any changes to the plan require the approval of this body. 
Level II.  The local government follows a long-term strategic plan (at least for the next 10 years). 
Partial goals or intermediate targets are frequently assessed by the Municipal 
Parliament. Any changes to the plan require the approval of this body. 
Level III.  The local government follows a medium to long-term strategic plan (at least for the 
next 5 years). Partial goals or intermediate targets are occasionally reviewed by the 
legislative body. 
Level IV. The local government holds total discretion regarding the setting of objectives. The 
investment policy is not directly linked to a comprehensive long-term strategic plan. 
C1 Debt to total revenue ratio (%). 
C2 Budget execution (% - weighting each entry by its initial amount) 
C3 Level I. All indicators in table A4 are at (or above) the “Good performance” level. 
Level II. Two of the indicators are at (or above) the “Good performance” level. The third 
indicator is not below the “Satisfactory performance” level. 
Level III. One of the indicators is at (or above) the “Good performance” level. The other two 
indicators are not below the “Satisfactory performance” level. 
Level IV.  All indicators are at (or above) the “Satisfactory performance” level. None is at the (or 
above the) “Good performance” level. 
Level V.  One of the indicators is below the “Satisfactory performance” level. 
Level VI.  Two of the indicators are below the “Satisfactory performance” level. 
Level VII. All indicators are below the “Satisfactory performance” level. 
C4 Level I. All indicators in table A5 are at (or above) the “Good performance” level. 
Level II. Two of the indicators are at (or above) the “Good performance” level. The third 
indicator is not below the “Satisfactory performance” level. 
Level III. One of the indicators is at (or above) the “Good performance” level. The other two 
indicators are not below the “Satisfactory performance” level. 
Level IV.  All indicators are at (or above) the “Satisfactory performance” level. None is at the (or 
above the) “Good performance” level. 
Level V.  One of the indicators is below the “Satisfactory performance” level. 
Level VI.  Two of the indicators are below the “Satisfactory performance” level. 
Level VII. All indicators are below the “Satisfactory performance” level. 
C5 Level I. Less than 1.0 complaint per 1000 customers and more than 4.0 selective collection 
containers per 1000 inhabitants. 
Level II. Less than 1.0 complaint per 1000 customers. Between 2.5 and 4.0 selective collection 
containers per 1000 inhabitants. 
Level III. Between 1.0 and 5.0 complaints per 1000 customers. More than 4.0 selective collection 
containers per 1000 inhabitants. 
Level IV. Between 1.0 and 5.0 complaints per 1000 customers. Between 2.5 and 4.0 selective 
collection containers per 1000 inhabitants. 
Level V. Between 1.0 and 5.0 complaints per 1000 customers. Less than 2.5 selective collection 
containers per 1000 inhabitants. 
Level VI. More than 5.0 complaints per 1000 customers and at least 2.5 selective collection 
containers per 1000 inhabitants. 
Level VII. More than 5.0 complaints per 1000 customers. 
C6 Social, cultural, educational and recreational services expenditure (€ per capita). 
D1 Different contractors/suppliers for contracts over 150.000€ in the last 4 years (contracts per 
supplier) 
D2 Level I. Water, wastewater and urban waste services’ tariff structures use price signals. Cost 
coverage (total revenues to total expenses ratio) is above 1.00. 
Level II.  Water and wastewater services’ tariff structures use price signals. Cost coverage is 
above 1.00. 
Level III.  Water, wastewater and urban waste services’ tariff structures use price signals. Cost 
coverage is between 0.90 and 1.00. 
Level IV.  Water and wastewater services’ tariff structures use price signals. Cost coverage is 
between 0.90 and 1.00. 
Level V.  Water and wastewater services are charged through linear pricing (fixed monthly fees 
may also be charged). Cost coverage is above 0.90. 
Level VI.  Water and wastewater services are charged through linear pricing (fixed monthly fees 
may also be charged). Cost coverage is below 0.90. 
D3 General local taxes collected in the year of analysis (€ per capita). 
E1 Average time elapsed between the provision of the service, material or equipment and the actual 
payment at 31 December (days). 
E2 Public contracts awarded through competitive tendering in the last 12 months (% of public 
procurement expenditure). 
E3 Prior approvals denied by the Supreme Audit Institution during the last four years (% of all 
contracts scrutinized). 
E4 Complaints received by the ombudsman concerning the municipality and its entities in the last 
three years (number per ten thousand inhabitants). 
 
Table A2. Items to be considered in the scoring of criterion A5 (transparency of municipalities) 
Predictive information Financial information Additional information 
Activities plan 


















Transfers and subsidies 
 
 Table A3. Items to be considered in the scoring of criterion A6 (transparency of other local entities and PPPs) 





















Transfers and subsidies 
 
Table A4. Reference levels for the quality of drinking water services (criterion C3) 
Indicator Good performance Satisfactory performance 
Water quality 99% of the water samples respect 
the EU parametric values 
95% of the water samples respect 
the EU parametric values 
Service interruptions 0.1 per 1000 household per year 0.35 per 1000 household per year 
Complaints 2 complaint per 1000 consumers 
per year 
8 complaints per 1000 consumers 
per year 
 
Table A5. Reference levels for the quality of wastewater services (criterion C4) 
Indicator Good performance Satisfactory performance 
Service coverage 99% of the urban population. 90% of the urban population.  
Wastewater treatment 100% of discharges respect the 
EU parameters 
95% of discharges respect the EU 
parameters 
Complaints 1 complaint per 1000 customers 
per year 
5 complaints per 1000 customers 
per year 
 
 
